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CRIMINAL LAW-MuNIciPAL ORDINANCE IMPOSING VICARIous
CRIMINAL LIABILITY UPON REGISTERED OWNER OF AUTOMOBILE
FOR PARKING VIOLATIONS

DOES NOT VIOLATE

DUE PROCESS.

City of Kansas City v. Hertz Corporation,499 S.W.2d 449 (Mo.
1973).
In City of Kansas City v. Hertz Corp.,' the Supreme Court of Missouri recently joined a small number of jurisdictions which have upheld
municipal ordinances imposing vicarious criminal liability upon the
owners of improperly parked automobiles. These ordinances apparently have been particularly disputed by car rental companies whose
customers have proved indifferent to municipal parking citations. Under the Kansas City ordinance, a registered owner could be held prima
facie responsible even if it were proved that another was driving the
vehicle, unless the owner could show the car was stolen or was otherwise being used without his consent.
The litigation stemmed from the issuance of a parking citation to
the permissive user of a motor vehicle rented from the Hertz Corporation. The automobile was found illegally parked in a bus zone, and
when the fine was not paid by the lessee the defendant Hertz was
charged with the violation. Two ordinances were discussed by the
court: 2

Section 34.1

Owner .

. .

. The operation or use of a mo-

tor vehicle in violation of the provisions of this chapter shall
be prima facie evidence that said motor vehicle was at the
time of such violation controlled, operated and used by the
owner thereof.

Section 34.344. Registered owner prima facie responsible
for violation. If any vehicle is found upon a street in violation of any provision of this chapter, the owner or person in
whose name such vehicle is registered in the records of any
city, county or state shall be held prima facie responsible for
such violation, if the driver thereof is not present.
Hertz, was found guilty under section 34.344 in the municipal
court, but obtained an acquittal on appeal to the circuit court. The
supreme court reversed for the city, rejecting Hertz's argument that
section 34.344 was not intended to impose absolute liability upon a
1. 499 S.W.2d 449 (Mo. 1973).
2. KANSAS Crri, Mo., REv. ORDINANcEs (1970).
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non-driver who permits another to use his car. The court noted that
section 34.1, defining "owner," generally creates only a presumption
that the owner was the operator of the vehicle at the time of the violation which may be rebutted by a showing that the automobile was being driven by another. Section 34.344, however, was held to place ab-

solute responsibility upon the owner regardless of a showing that another was using the car.
The court also rejected Hertz's contention that the ordinance violated the due process clauses of the Missouri and United States Constitutions. The court found that the purpose of the ordinance was to permit public streets to be used to their best advantage by the public.
Reasoning that the major problem of keeping traffic moving necessitated strong action on the part of the city and that the fine was minor
and there was no potential incarceration, the court held the ordinance

constitutional.
The Hertz decision is certainly not according to the weight of authority,4 but a few other jurisdictions have upheld similar ordinances.

The Massachusetts decision in Commonwealth v. Minicost Car Rental
Inc.,' presented an identical situation to that of Hertz and was relied
upon heavily by the Missouri court. The municipal ordinance in Minicost placed absolute liability on the owner of a motor vehicle when an3. For discussion of the various types of municipal ordinances which have been
reviewed by the courts see Comment, Ownership as Evidence of Responsibility for Parking Violation, 41 J. COIM. L.C. & P.S. 61 (1950), in which the following observation
is made:
The statutes and ordinances which make owners prima facie responsible
for parking violations fall into two general classes. First, there are those which
provide that the facts of violation and ownership together raise a prima facie
presumption that the owner committed the offense. This presumption is
rebuttable. The second type omits any reference to a prima facie presumption. It declares merely that whenever an automobile is parked illegally the
registered owner shall be subject to the penalty for such violation (footnotes
omitted).
The author continued by noting that most courts that have construed the second type
of ordinance purporting to impose absolute liability, such as section 34.344, have found
it to create a mere rebuttable presumption that the owner was the driver, thus avoiding
the constitutional question.
Typically, a municipality will adopt one type of ordinance or the other. It is unclear why the city of Kansas City deemed it necessary to adopt both types unless it desired to limit the rebuttable presumption of section 34.1 to moving violations and the absolute liability of section 34.344 to parking violations.
4. Red Top Driv-Ur-Self v. Potts, 227 Ark. 627, 300 S.W.2d 261 (1957); City of
Seattle v. Stone, 410 P.2d 583 (Wash. 1966). In Stone, the ordinance imposed absolute
liability expressly negating as a defense that the owner was not the driver, except for
commercial lessors of automobiles. The entire ordinance was struck down. See generally Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 456 (1956).
5. 242 N..2d 411 (Mass. 1968).
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The Massachusetts court

found that the single fine was minor and not a deprivation of property
without due process of law, despite the obvious potential for a large

cumulative liability when a car rental firm is involved. Since the car
rental contract provided for indemnification against the lessee for parking fines assessed against the vehicle and charged to the lessor, the de-

fendant was deemed adequately protected.6
In Kinny Car Corp. v. City of New York,7 a municipal ordinance

purported to make lessors and bailors of motor vehicles jointly and severably liable with their customers for parking violations committed
within the city. Several car rental companies brought an action to have
the ordinance declared unconstitutional as a denial of due process and
equal protection. In a short opinion, the Court of Appeals of New
York affirmed an order of the appellate division upholding its validity.
In the two Oklahoma cities where nonchalant car renters might

pose a parking problem the ordinances are not as stringent as those
in Kansas City, Boston and New York. As a consequence, Oklahoma

has not construed an ordinance similar to the section relied on
in Hertz." However, in Cantrell v. Oklahoma City,9 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did deal with an ordinance imposing
a presumption of guilt. The ordinance provided that proof (1) of the
violation and (2) that the defendant was the registered owner of the

vehicle would constitute a prima facie presumption that the owner was
6. The identical ordinance had previously been construed in Commonwealth v.
Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N.E. 601 (1934), but the defendant merely challenged the ordinance without introducing evidence as to who parked the car. In upholding the ordi.
nance and imposing liability the court used ambiguous language and it was never clear,
at least to some courts, whether the Ober ordinance created a rebuttable presumption
or absolute liability; see City of Seattle v. Stone, 410 P.2d 583 (Wash. 1966). The
Minicost decision has resolved the question.
7. 28 N.Y.2d 741, 269 N.E.2d 829 (1971).
8. Heretofore, the bulk of Oklahoma case law has dealt with the right of a municipality to regulate the use of its streets. In Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P.2d
1015 (1937), an action involving the validity of the Oklahoma City parking meter ordinances, the Oklahoma Supreme Court established the right of cities to regulate the use
of the streets through their police power. This same theme was elaborated in Hirsh v.
Oklahoma City, 94 Okla. Crim. 249, 234 P.2d 925 (1951), where the court of criminal
appeals sustained the power of a municipality to adopt reasonable measures which remove the causes of traffic congestion. As early as 1922, in McGuire v.' Wilkerson, 22
Okla. Crim. 36, 209 P. 445 (1922), it was held that ordinances regulating the parking
of automobiles did not deprive the owners and operators of such vehicles of their liability
or property without the due process of law. Along these same lines, in, an action challenging the ability of the city of Lawton to regulate parking at its municipal airport,
the supreme court in Ex parte Houston, 93 Okla. Crim. 26, 224 P.2d 281 (1950), held
that courts will indulge every presumption to sustain the validity of parking regulations.
9. 454 P.2d 676 (Okla. Crim. 1969).
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